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As companies are increasingly trying to protect information by designating it as a trade secret, courts are
increasingly trying to resolve litigation disputes relating to trade secrets misappropriation issues. Trends
have emerged from these court cases, further defining the limits of trade secrets protection and attempting
to carve out uniform rules concerning such protection. This article highlights some of the most
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"Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items of lesser
or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which
items still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement."1
Thirty years has done little to sap the strength and relevance of Chief Justice Burger's
words. Indeed, there is no secret behind the spirit and policy underlying trade secrets law.
What often remains hidden, however, is the myriad of emerging trends and developments
that imbue trade secrets law. Trade secrets law, like many issues in the law, evolves with
the vicissitudes of modern life. More than ever, companies are cognizant of the need to
protect information and accordingly, litigation involving trade secrets abounds. 2 This article
will flush out today's burgeoning trends in trade secrets law through the author's experience
and an analysis of recent case law.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Constitutional issues are beginning to appear in trade secrets cases. 3 This section
addresses how courts analyze constitutional issues surrounding trade secrets cases, such as a
party's ability to have a jury trial and the courts ability to reduce a jury determined damage
award - remittitur. 4 The first case dealing with constitutional trade secrets issues, Evans v.
Genera] Motors Corp., specifically addresses the right to a jury trial. 5 In that case, the trial
6
The plaintiffs, however, objected, 7
judge had decided that a bench trial was appropriate.
claiming they were entitled to a trial by jury under the Connecticut constitution. 8 The
Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that a party has a constitutional right to a jury trial
for trade secret claims where damages are sought. 9 The court also found that jury trials
were conducted by English courts of law as early as 1818 when the Connecticut constitution
was adopted10 - a finding that supported the conclusion that jury trials for trade secrets
* R. Mark Halligan, Esq. is a principal in the Chicago intellectual property firm of Welsh & Katz, Ltd.,
and a member of the adjunct faculty at The John Marshall Law School where he teaches trade secrets law
and trade secrets litigation. Mr. Halligan is the sponsor of the TRADE SECRETS HOME PAGE on the
Internet. See www.rmarkhalligan.com.
Mr. Halligan is Chairman of the American Bar Association
Intellectual Property Law Section Trade Secrets Committee, Vice Chair of the Trade Secrets Committee of
the American Intellectual Property Law Association, and Co-Chair of the Trade Secrets Licensing
Subcommittee of the Licensing Executives Society. Special thanks to Sherry Rollo who worked on the edits.
I Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
2 See generallyR. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets Case Law Database, http://www.asksam.com/halligan/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006) (containing summaries of every reported decision involving trade secrets).
3 See generally Braun Med., Inc. v. Rogers, 163 F. App'x 500 (9th Cir. 2006); Evans v. GM Corp., 893
A.2d 371 (Conn. 2006).
See Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990) ("A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the
court that it is shocked by the jury's award of damages.").
See Evans, 893 A.2d at 379 ("[It is proper to consider whether the right to a jury trial on trade secret
claims is guaranteed under the Connecticut constitution.").
1 Id. at 375.
7 Id. at 376.
8 Id.
Id. at 384 ("An examination of CUTSA and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act therefore supports our
conclusion that trade secret protection was available under the common law and, as a result, the plaintiffs
have a right to a jury trial on their trade secret claims seeking damages.").
10 Id. at 381 ("We thus conclude ...that, although plaintiffs in the early nineteenth century could seek
injunctive relief in courts of equity to restrain defendants from misappropriating business secrets, English
courts of law during that time also conducted jury trials on trade secret claims seeking damages.").
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were permissible.1 1 Furthermore, the court stated that Connecticut protects the right to a
jury trial, and this right is mandatory and not discretionary. 12
B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Rogers is another case that dealt with the issue of a litigant's
ability to have a jury trial in a trade secrets case. 13 The court in B. Braun Med. analyzed
whether a trial court has the ability to reduce damages awarded by a jury. 14 The district
court disagreed with the monetary verdict that the jury returned and subsequently reduced
the damages award. 15 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the remittitur,
holding that the reduction was a violation of the Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution.16 Specifically, the court analyzed the Seventh Amendment's restriction that
"no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."17 The court noted that the district court's
remittitur was not permitted because it was ordered without affording the opposing party
the option to a new trial.18 The above examples demonstrate the emerging facet of
constitutional trade secrets law and forecast significant litigation to come.

II. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE DISCOVERY
The specialized field of trade secrets law and intellectual property in general,
continuously evolves. As this evolution occurs, lawyers continue to confront new problems.
One of these problems involves electronic evidence discovery. With electronic discovery, a
party can often prove up a trade secrets case with an EnCase image 19 of the opponent's
computer. This is especially significant when a former employee leaves data on a computer.
A common scenario begins when a terminated employee keeps his personal computer loaded
with trade secrets.
One option might be to give the computers to an attorney if the former employee is faced
with a trade secrets misappropriation lawsuit. The former employee's attorney could then
keep the computer and claim there was no misuse of the information because all the
computers were in the possession of the former employee's attorney. However, Haught v.
Louis Berkman LLC, a recent case from the Northern District of West Virginia, provides an
example of when disposing the material by giving it to a third party attorney may not be the
I Soo id. at 380. The court determined a party's right to a jury trial, under the Connecticut
constitution, is determined by comparing the action at issue to a similar action available for a jury trial in
1818 when the Connecticut constitution was adopted. Id. Essentially, the court must inquire whether the
course of action is rooted in the common law, and, if so, whether the remedy involved at common law was one
sound in law or equity. Id. Therefore, the court stated, "[i]n determining whether an action existed at
common law and involved a legal remedy, we look for guidance to Connecticut case law, to the common law
of England and to federal and state jurisdictions that have considered the question." Id.
12 See id. at 379 (citing the Connecticut constitution for the proposition that if a right to a jury trial
existed at the time of its adoption, that right would remain intact).
13 See Braun Med., Inc. v. Rogers, 163 F. App'x 500 (9th Cir. 2006).
11 Soo id.at 506-07.
' Soo id.at 503 ("Following post-trial motions, the district court reduced the $16 million compensatory
damage award to $5 million.").
61 Id. at 507 ("To the extent that the district court substituted its own judgment as to the damages that
should have been awarded, it violated the Seventh Amendment. The jury award for compensatory damages
must be reinstated.").
17 Id. at 506 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
18 Id. "A court violates the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial by ordering a remittitur
without affording the [affected] party the option of a new trial." Id. The court continued, '[i]f a court
determines that a jury's damages award is excessive after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, it may grant defendant's motion for a new trial or deny the motion conditional upon the
prevailing party accepting a remittitur." Id. The court summarized the law stating, "[t]he prevailing party is
given the option of either submitting to a new trial or of accepting a reduced amount of damage which the
court considers justified." Id.
19 EnCase software (sold by Guidance Software) is the standard electronic evidence forensic tool now
used to preserve evidence by creating a "snapshot" of a computer at a given point in time.
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best course of action. 20 In Haught, the court held that providing information containing
trade secrets to third party attorneys constituted an unauthorized disclosure. 21 Ironically,
the former employee may have been better off simply throwing the information in the
garbage, and in News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, the employee did just
22
that.
23
In Marquis, the employee threw out the information in the form of paper documents.
The court found there was never any harm to the plaintiff employer and, therefore, there was
no misappropriation by the defendant employee. 24 These results are seemingly inconsistent
with the tendency to want to prevent spoliation in the electronic computer environment. Of
course, the safest approach is not to retain any proprietary documents of the former
employer and to return all information before termination.
Another issue is account transfer forms. Specifically, a question exists as to whether the
account transfer forms, filled out in preparation of the employee's change in location, must be
considered. The Eastern District of Michigan answered this question when it held that
similar measures were not actionable because the employer's client information did not
qualify as a trade secret. 25 The court also did not find tortious interference. 26 Fiduciary duty
was not litigated, and the court held there were no actionable issues, despite the employee
filling out account transfer forms prior to leaving employment. 27 The court based its holding
on the doctrine stating one can prepare to compete as long as one does not actually start the
28
effective process of competing before leaving the company.

III. IDENTIFICATION WITH PARTICULARITY
This section considers the question of how detailed the description of a trade secret
needs to be in a complaint. The requirement that a party identify trade secrets with
particularity before discovery is a statutory requirement in California 29 and under the
common law of other jurisdictions.30 The underlying concept is that a defending party cannot
adequately defend against a case without knowing what the client is alleged to have stolen or
misappropriated. In recent years, the trend has been to require detailed disclosures before
discovery begins. This was the norm until one plaintiff, requesting a writ of mandamus,
See gonorallyvaught v. Louis Berkman LLC, 417 F. Supp. 2d 784 (N.D. W. Va. 2006).
Id. at 784 ("Plaintiff Leonard breached her duty of confidentiality because she disclosed confidential
information to a third party, her attorneys."). See also Zahodnick v. IBM, 135 F.3d 911, 915 (4th Cir. 1997)
20
21

(holding confidential information cannot be supplied to a third party attorney).
22

See News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, No. CV000177440S, 2003 WL 22904123, at *8 (Conn.

Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2003) ("There was no evidence [the defendant] disclosed this trade secret to anyone before

he threw it in the trash.").
23 Id.
24 See

id. (finding plaintiff could not demonstrate harm where the defendant employee never used the
trade secret).
2, Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Boerjan, 411 F. Supp. 2d 689, 694 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
21
27
28

Id. at 699.
Id. at 700-01.
See id. at 700 ("Preparations, of themselves, do not support a breach of fiduciary duty sufficient to

support an injunction.").
29 See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2019.210 (West 2006).
In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (Title 5 (commencing with Section 3426) of Part 1 of Division 4 of the Civil
Code), before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the
misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity subject to
any orders that may be appropriate under Section 3426.5 of the Civil Code.

Id.
'30 See, e.g., AutoMed Techs. Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (noting the court will
generally require a party to identify "with reasonable particularity the matter which it claims constitutes a
trade secret, before it will be allowed (given a proper showing of need) to compel discovery of its adversary's
trade secrets.").
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appealed his case to an appellate court in California.3 1 In this case of first impression
regarding trade secrets discovery,3 2 the court construed the statutory requirement to require
only that a plaintiff designate the alleged trade secrets at issue to get the proceedings
started, but it was never meant to require the kind of detailed disclosures that would occur
after discovery.33 The court stated in pertinent part:
The letter and spirit of [Cal. Code Civ. Proc.] section 2019.210 require[s] the
plaintiff, subject to an appropriate protective order, to identify or designate
the trade secrets at issue with sufficient particularity to limit the permissible
scope of discovery by distinguishing the trade secrets from matters of general
knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons .. .skilled in
34
the trade.
The court continued, and defined "reasonable particularity" as requiring the plaintiff to show
the court that the provided detail is "fair, proper, just and rational ... under all of the
circumstances." 3 5
Reasonable particularity also requires that the plaintiff "identify [the]
alleged trade secret in a manner that will allow the trial court to control the scope of
subsequent discovery, protect all parties' proprietary information, and allow them a fair
36
opportunity to prepare and present their best case or defense at a trial on the merits."
Consequently, depending on the alleged trade secrets at issue in each case, the degree of
particularity will differ.3 7 Furthermore, the trial court can consider relevant evidence in
determining the adequacy of the description of the trade secrets. 38 However, the proponent
of the alleged trade secret does not need to describe the material "with the greatest degree of
particularity possible, or to reach such an exacting level of specificity that even its opponents
are forced to agree the designation is adequate. . . . What is required is not absolute
precision, but 'reasonable particularity.' ' 3 9 Using these definitions and principals as guides,
the court granted the writ and vacated and remanded to the trial court. 40 This demonstrates
that the courts are beginning to relax requirements for trade secret identification at the early
stages of the lawsuit.
In Roup v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the defendant was given notice for a
deposition, and he appeared. 41 However, when the plaintiffs counsel began to ask questions,
the defendant's counsel stopped the deposition, instructing his client not to answer any more
questions because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the California UTSA statutory
requirements to identify the trade secrets with reasonable particularity before commencing
discovery. 42 The court granted sanctions against defense counsel for stopping the deposition,
and subsequently the case went up on appeal. 43 The appellate court reversed, because the
plaintiff had not identified his trade secrets with particularity, and there was just cause for
stopping the deposition under the California statute.

31 See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 905 (Ct. App. 2005) ("AMS
filed a petition for writ of mandate to reverse that portion of the trial court's order which permits Sputtered
Films to conduct discovery on all causes of action other than its cause of action under the UTSA for
misappropriation of trade secrets.").
32 Id. at 903 ("This is a first impression trade secret civil discovery case.").
33 Id. at 907-09.
M31Id. at 907.
35 Id. at 908.

36 Id.
37

Id.

38 Id.
39 Id.

40 Id. at 909 (discussing section 2019.210 of the Cal. Code of Civ. Proc.).
41

Roup v. Super. Ct., No. B188652, 2006 WL 710891, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2006).

42

Id.

43 Id. at *4.
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IV. IDENTIFICATION WITH STANDING

Standing to bring a trade secrets case is an issue often ignored. In RPM,Inc. v. Oatey
Company,44 the court announced a rule for determining whether a plaintiff has standing to
bring a trade secrets case. The court held in order for a plaintiff to have standing to bring a
trade secrets case, the plaintiff must either: own the trade secrets; have possession of the
trade secrets; or have a right to control the trade secrets. 45 Furthermore, the plaintiff must
46
demonstrate the active steps taken to protect and maintain the secrecy of the trade secrets.
Therefore, if one has a right to control his trade secrets, but is not able to demonstrate the
47
exercise of any active steps to protect those trade secrets, he does not have standing.

V. DISPLACEMENT DOCTRINE

Another recent trend shows a retreat from the statutory displacement of other causes of
action relating to trade secrets misappropriation. 48 If a cause of action "conflicts" with the
trade secrets misappropriation claim then it is "displaced" or "preempted." Recently, courts
are beginning to first determine whether the information rises to the level of a trade secret
before determining whether a cause of action should be displaced. 49 If proof of a "trade
secret" is not necessary for recovery under the other causes of action, then there is no
displacement by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

VI. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Unjust enrichment claims are making a comeback in trade secrets law. Unjust
enrichment claims are another way for a plaintiff to seek recovery for ill gotten gains. Courts
are now looking at a plaintiffs description of the alleged trade secret and stating that, if the
information at issue does not rise to the level of a trade secret, there is no trade secrets
claim.
However, an unjust enrichment claim arises when there is a misuse of the
information at issue under circumstances where it would be unjust for the defendant to have
obtained the benefit without having paid for it. For example, in APG, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., the First Circuit noted trade secrets comprise, "information that
is 'not ...readily ascertainable by proper means by . . .other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use."' 50 In that case, the court held the information did
not qualify as a trade secret, because the information at issue was obtainable through
normal business methods. 51 However, the court did permit an unjust enrichment claim,

44 RPM, Inc. v. Oatey Co., No. 3282-M, 3289-M, 2005 WL 663057, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2005)
("The law in Ohio .. .is that to bring a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, one must either own or
have possession or a right to control the trade secrets and have taken active steps to maintain their
secrecy.").

4 Id.
46
47

Id.
Id.

48 Section 8 of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA"),
modeled after the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
('UTSA"), provides, in relevant part: [JITSA] is intended to displace conflicting tort, restitutionary, unfair
competition, and other laws of this State providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret." 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/8 (West 2006). In other words, the ITSA preempts and displaces any conflicting cause
of action involving trade secrets previously available under common law. Id.
4 Soo, e.g., Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady Foods, Inc., No. 05-C-6022, 2006 WL 1460461 (N.D.

Ill. Apr. 6, 2006).
F,0
APG, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 436 F.3d 294, 307 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6 41 1
4Q) (2005)).
51 Id.
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because the defendant received a benefit - access to a certain customer account. 52
Therefore, under the circumstances, the plaintiff had a viable unjust enrichment claim
53
against the defendant for retaining a benefit without paying for it.

VII. ABSENCE OF CAUSATION
Another recent development in trade secrets law relates to the causation claim. The
reasoning is that even if liability exists, one must nonetheless show a proximate causal
relationship between that liability and any damages. Cases frequently arise where liability
can be found, but the nexus between the liability and the damages is absent, precluding a
finding of causation. Generally, the defendants win these cases.
Furthermore, focusing on the remedy-side is the preferred strategy for defendants in
trade secrets cases, because that way the plaintiff could win the battle but lose the war. For
example, if things are not progressing well on the liability side for a defendant in a case
where an injunction is sought by the plaintiff, a wise approach would be for the defendant to
develop evidence in the record demonstrating the product at issue could have been
independently developed, without reference to the trade secrets, in a short period of time, say
six months. So, once an injunction is granted, the duration of the injunction will be very
limited because this evidence is in the record.
From a damages perspective, it is possible to eliminate proximate cause. For instance,
even if misappropriated documents were found on an employee's computer, there may be no
direct and proximate causal relationship to the loss of business or to the things that the
plaintiff claims resulted in damages. The courts are now examining the causation issue with
a stern eye. It is often difficult to connect a piece of information, not generally known in the
trade and to which one had unauthorized access, to actual damages. Therefore, one can win
these cases by both focusing on causation and showing its absence. Two examples that
highlight the successful application of this strategy are Do It Best Corp. v. Passport
Software, Inc,54 and MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A. 55 In both of those cases,
the courts found that there was no proximate causation, and did not award the plaintiff
damages.56

VIII. PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS THROUGH CONTRACT LAW
Contracts should be used more often to identify and protect trade secrets rights. The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") represents the statutory "default" position of the parties
absent a contract between the parties.
Courts now assert contracts that specify the
procedures for protection, identification, and classification of trade secrets rights can trump a
UTSA claim.
Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. provides an example where a
confidentiality agreement existed between the parties. 57 In that case, the plaintiff claimed it
disclosed trade secrets to the defendant who in turn disclosed the same information to the
plaintiffs competitors. 58 The defendant argued the confidentiality agreement called for the
52 Id. at 306. "The evidence of record thus appears sufficient to allow a finding that all three elements
of the unjust enrichment claim were met: (1) a benefit (access to the CVS account) (2) of which the defendant
was aware, and (3) that was accepted in circumstances in which failure to pay would be inequitable." Id.
3 Id.
54 Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01-C-7674, 2005 WL 743083 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2005).
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56 Do ItBest Corp., 2005 WL 743083, at "16 ("Passport offers numerous facts that purportedly establish
a violation of the ITSA, but there is nothing to tie that alleged violation to DIB's provision of maintenance
services to its members."); MieroStrategy,429 F.3d at 1358.
57 Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 02-C-346, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14410 (N.D. Ill. July 14,
2005).
oS

Id. at *6.
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plaintiff to designate in writing any document the plaintiff considered to contain a trade
secret as confidential or proprietary. 59 The plaintiff countered by arguing that there were
implied obligations of confidentiality because the defendant knew or had reason to know the
disclosed information contained trade secrets. 60 The court held that, while there may have
been implied duties of confidentiality, the contract mandated that if the plaintiff considered a
61
document to contain a trade secret, the plaintiff was to mark the document "confidential."
The plaintiff failed to adhere to the terms of the contract, and accordingly, the court
62
dismissed the trade secrets claim.

IX. SPOLIATION
Another trend in trade secrets law is the application of the spoliation doctrine. 63 The
doctrine states the court may infer misappropriation from defendant's destruction of
evidence. 64 Indeed, a plaintiff can win by either finding the files that are the basis of the
claim in the defendant's possession or alternatively, by proving that the files have been
intentionally eradicated. 65 If the files have been deliberately destroyed or altered, that
constitutes spoliation. 66 Spoliation of evidence supports an inference of a misappropriation
under the theory that a person would not have destroyed or deleted a document if that
person did not believe the document supported a finding of misappropriation. 67 Because
trade secrets are an amorphous intellectual property right and a question of fact for the jury,
the inference of misappropriation is often enough to win the case.
In Advantacare Health Partners,LP v. Access IV, Inc. the court addressed the issue of
spoliation. 68 In that case, the first thing the defendant did after the plaintiff initiated suit
was destroy all of the files on his computer. 69 When the court discovered what the defendant
had done, it imposed sanctions.70 The court then entered an order stating the lawyers could
create an image of everything remaining on the computer.7 1 However, the defendant left a
,9 Id.at *29.
60 Id. at **15-16.
61 Id. at **32-33.
132 Id. at *33.
63

See, e.g., Jay E. Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will Spoil A Spoliator's

Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1004 ("[T]he pervasiveness of spoliation is alarming and quite possibly a
regularly occurring problem in every attorney's practice."). See also Select Med. Corp. v. Hardaway, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15326, **28-29 (D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2006) (defining spoliation as "the destruction or significant
alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or
reasonably foreseeable litigation.").
64 See Liebert Corp. v. Mazur, 357 Ill. App. 3d 265, 283 (App. Ct. 2005) (holding spoliation of evidence
supports an inference of trade secret misappropriation).
6
Id. at 286 ("Where a party has deliberately destroyed evidence, a trial court will indulge all
reasonable presumptions against the party.").
6 Id. However, spoliation requires bad faith. See Farmer v. Iowa, C99 132 MWB, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17029, **60-61 (D. Iowa Apr. 27, 2001) ("[C]ourts almost universally have held spoliation instruction
is not warranted in the absence of bad faith."). The burden shifts to the other party if willful destruction of
evidence is shown. United States ex rel. Judd v. Maloy, 3-:03-CV-241, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63465, *33 (D.
Ohio Sept. 6, 2006) ("If the plaintiff shows that the defendant willfully destroyed evidence, the burden shifts
to the defendant to persuade the trial court that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the destruction of
evidence."). Intentional destruction is defined as "the removal of evidence for the purpose of rendering it
inaccessible or useless to another party." Id. at *32.
67 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Inherent in this
[spoliation] definition is the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or
reasonably foreseeable litigation.").
6S Advantacare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, Inc., No. C-03-4496-JF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12794,
at **2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2005).
c)' Id. at *3.
70 Id. at *4.
71 Id. at **4-6.
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few things out that were not imaged.72 The trade secrets appeared again at some later point
in litigation, but not everything that was required to be produced was produced, leading to
further complications in the case. 73 The court finally entered a default judgment in favor of
74
the plaintiff on the trade secrets claim, and found spoliation of the evidence.

X. INJUNCTIONS AND THEIR DISSOLUTION

Attorneys litigating trade secrets cases involving injunctions are often required to
approach a case with circumspection. Attorneys risk an adverse result when filing a trade
secrets case before gathering all of the necessary information and then moving for a
preliminary injunction. Similarly, it is often unwise to move immediately for a Temporary
Restraining Order ("TRO") because, if an attorney loses the TRO proceeding, clients and
others following the case perceive this as the attorney having lost the case. Such a
perception is prevalent despite the hesitation by trial courts to grant injunctions. Therefore,
an attorney moving for an injunction should be sure that he has a very strong case. The
appropriate strategy for attorneys in this type of situation is to wait until everything is in
order - including the evidence and some initial discovery - before moving for the
injunction.
However, there are drawbacks to delaying in moving for an injunction. Due to the
passage of time, the court may find that there is no irreparable injury. For example, in
Square D Co. v. Van Handel, the court held the fact that one and a half years had lapsed
since the alleged misappropriation indicated there was no irreparable harm.7 5 Accordingly,
76
the court denied the injunction.
Another litigation tactic, available to the defense, but rarely utilized, is moving to
dissolve an injunction against further use of the trade secrets at issue. Even when a trade
secrets misappropriation lawsuit appears to be over, a party can still move to dissolve the
injunction under the UTSA when the information at issue is no longer a trade secret, or
when there is no longer any commercial advantage in maintaining the information as a trade
secret. Although this tactic was unsuccessfully attempted in MicroStrategy v. Business
ObjeCts, 77 it is important for a party to recognize that even if one loses a trade secrets
misappropriation case under the UTSA and an injunction is granted, the losing party can
still move to dissolve the injunction.78 In MicroStrategy, an injunction was issued that
effectively enjoined the defendants from engaging in any future misappropriation of the
documents identified as trade secrets.7 9 Six months after the grant of injunction the
defendant moved to dissolve the injunction.8 0 Although this was a sound litigation strategy,
the tactic failed because the defendant filed his motion to dissolve the injunction too soon.

XI. ACCIDENTALLY WAIVING TRADE SECRETS RIGHTS
Attorneys must also be prudent during the pleading stage of litigation. An attorney
must exercise care to avoid waiving trade secrets rights when disclosing evidence in a
pleading. For example, if an attorney attaches an exhibit containing trade secrets to a
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
74 Id. at *7.
75 Square D Co. v. Van Handel, No. 04-C-775, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21480, at *19 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25,
72

73

2005).
76 Id. at *28.
77 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
78

Id.

79 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 431 (E.D. Va. 2004).

80 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 369 F. Supp. 2d 725, 735 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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complaint not under seal, and files it in the clerk's office, the defendant may move to dismiss
the complaint because the attorney waived the trade secrets rights. That was the issue in
Cureio Webb LCC. v. NationalBenefit ProgramsAgency, Inc. 81 In that case, the court denied
summary judgment on the trade secrets issue, holding that attaching a document containing
trade secrets to a pleading does not destroy a misappropriation claim the plaintiff may have
had at some moment in time.8 2 The plaintiff argued as a result of the misappropriation, the
information was no longer a trade secret at the time the complaint was filed. However, the
information was a trade secret at the time the alleged misappropriation occurred. The court
83
agreed with the plaintiffs argument, and did not dismiss the suit.

XII. THIRD PARTIES

Whether a company, an employer, or an independent contractor, the UTSA requires that
in order to hold a third party liable, the third party must know or have reason to know that it
was receiving the trade secret information of another party.8 4 It has been held that the
element of knowledge for third party liability is satisfied when a third party makes an
unauthorized disclosure of trade secret information.85
In recent cases, employers defending against actions based on third party liability argue
that although the employee may have committed misappropriating acts in bringing in trade
secrets from his former employer, the employer did not know or have reason to know of the
misappropriation.8 6 A few years ago, the Virginia courts dealt with this issue by holding the
doctrine of respondeat superior applied - the agent employee was acting within the scope of
87
his employment, and the employer received the benefit of those nefarious activities.
Therefore, the court held the employer was liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability 88
respondeatsuperior.
However, the problem of third parties gaining access to trade secret information by
other means persists. Although, there is a knowledge requirement that must be met in order
to establish third party liability, a Minnesota case, Internet, Inc. v. Tensar Polyteehnologies,
81

Curcio Webb LLC v. Nat'l Benefit Programs Agency, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1205 (S.D. Ohio

2005) ("Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot prevail on its trade secret misappropriation claim because
Plaintiff placed its Proposal Document in the public domain when it attached the document to the
Complaint.").
83

Id. at 1206-07.
Id.

84

Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-50 (West 2006); Evans v. GM Corp., 893 A.2d 371,

82

373 (Conn. 2006).
S5 See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 736 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984) ("We see no reason
for accrual purposes to distinguish between wrongful acquisition of a trade secret by a third party who does
not stand in a confidential relationship to the plaintiff and wrongful disclosure in a two party situation...
where the defendant does have a confidential relationship with plaintiff.").
86 See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 418 (D. Va. 2004) ("[I]t is
relevant ... to note that an employer can be liable for trade secret misappropriation committed by an
employee acting within the scope of his employment through the doctrine of respondeat superior.") "One can
act in the scope of one's employment even if the specific acts performed are explicitly forbidden by the
employer, so long as the act was intended to further the employer's interests rather than being wholly
motivated by personal interest. Id. "Moreover, the employer need not even be aware of its employee's
activity." Id.

87 Id.
88 Id. at 429.
Clearly, many of the plaintiffs ex-employees engaged in extensive conduct that could be
considered unethical, improper, and in breach of their employment agreements. These
employees solicited or brought with them . . . a number of confidential documents ...
several of which the court concludes constituted trades secrets, and many more of which
might very well have been trade secrets regardless of the insufficient evidence presented at
trial to support such an inference.
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Inc., demonstrates the difficulty in proving such knowledge. 8 9 In that case, the former
employee that took the trade secrets went on to start up his own consulting firm with former
customers of his former employer. 90 Then, he actively used those trade secrets in order to
solicit business.9 1 The court did not grant a preliminary injunction because there was
insufficient evidence that the third party receiving the alleged trade secrets knew, or had
reason to know, that what he was receiving from the former employee consultant were
92
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets.

XIII. PROCEDURAL MOTIONS
In civil actions brought under the legal theories of agency and vicarious liability, a
common trend is for parties to file Rule 19 motions to dismiss for the failure to join a
necessary and indispensable party. 93 Trade secret misappropriation cases are no different.
The defendant will argue that a necessary party isabsent, while at the same time knowing
that adding the necessary party would destroy diversity of citizenship, required for federal
jurisdiction. This tactic results in a dispute about whether the absent party is absolutely
necessary. A good example is Ethypharm S.A. France v. Bentley Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,
where the parent company, but not the subsidiary, was sued for violation of the Delaware
Uniform Trade Secret Act ("DUTSA"). 94 The issue was whether the case could proceed
without the subsidiary, which handled most of the negotiation contracts and all related
activities. 95 The court examined the issue under the "agency test," and ultimately found that
an agency relationship may in fact exist.96 Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss the case
was denied without prejudice to renew, permitting the plaintiff to engage in discovery to
determine whether the defendant could be liable either as a joint tortfeasor or under the
97
agency test.
In addition to Rule 19 motions to dismiss, other procedural issues that arise in trade
secrets cases are personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, choice of law, and choice of
the venue. All of these procedural motions can tie up any trade secrets case, sometimes for
months at a time. Of course, this strategy risks losing an irreparable injury argument and
may affect other issues that come into play due to the passage of time. In a trade secrets
case, the passage of time usually benefits the defendant - at least in an injunction situation.
89

Internet Inc. v. Tensar Polytechnologies, Inc., No. 05-317 (RHK/AJB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495,

**4-6 (D.Minn. Oct. 3, 2005).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at **30-31. The court said "itis unclear precisely what trade secrets [the defendant] currently
possesses or whether [the defendant even] knew it was benefiting from misappropriated trade secrets at the
time it used them." Id. at *30. However, the court also noted there was no "evidence of which products [the
defendant] actually modified, or whether ... any modifications were explicitly based on specific information."
Id. at **30-31.
93 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
94 Ethypharm S.A. France v. Bentley Pharm., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. Del. 2005).
W, Id. at 430-431. In determining the relationship of the parties, the court observed,
[i]f Belmac is deemed a necessary and indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19,
diversity jurisdiction would be extinguished and the case dismissed .... If plaintiffs can
establish that Belmac acted as an agent of defendant, defendant would be held vicariously
liable for Belmac's acts. Plaintiffs . . . do not contest that Belmac is a necessary and
indispensable party under a Rule 19 analysis. Rather, plaintiffs assert that Belmac is the
agent of defendant and, therefore, need not be joined. The court concludes discovery is
necessary to develop this claim.
Id.
96 Id. at 432. Under the agency approach, "[i]n order for the parent corporation to be liable under this

test, there must be 'a close connection between the relationship of the corporations and the cause of action."'
Id. (citation omitted).
97 Id.
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As time continues to pass the plaintiffs argument that they are irreparably damaged as a
result of the defendant's actions begins to fail. Of course, in a damages situation, the
opposite may be true and the plaintiff could benefit. In a damages case, as time passes the
plaintiffs damages continue to increase.

XIV. OTHER INTERESTING TRADE SECRETS DEVELOPMENTS
A.

OSTRICH DEFENSE

There are many defenses available to defendants in trade secrets cases. However,
98
ignorance is not one of those defenses, and what is often known as the "ostrich defense"
does not work in trade secrets law. Likewise, plaintiffs cannot rely on ignorance or lack of
knowledge to overcome a statute of limitations defense. In Ador Industries,Inc. v. Beveorp,
LLC, the court held that the statute of limitations implies a duty upon the plaintiff to
investigate whether there was trade secret misappropriation. 99 The court in that case,
rejecting the assertion that actual knowledge of the misappropriation was required, charged
the plaintiff with knowledge because plaintiff had sufficient reason to suspect
misappropriation of its trade secrets. 100 That suspicion started the clock for the purposes of
the statute of limitations. 101

B. Al or Nothing Trap
An attorney should also be wary of an "all or nothing trap" when claiming damages. For
example, if an attorney has a damages claim that is based upon the theft of eleven trade
secrets for twelve million dollars, but the jury comes back and only finds five out of the
eleven trade secrets were misappropriated, if the attorney had no sliding scale for a damages
claim, the twelve million dollar damages disappear completely. 02 Micro International
10 2
Limited v. MonolithicPower Systems, Inc. is representative of this type of trap.

C. Conversion Claims
A cause of action that often arises in trade secrets cases is a claim of conversion.
10 3
Although conversion claims are often displaced or preempted by trade secrets statutes,
98 See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1978).

The ostrich defense is

where a defendant "deliberately 'shut[s] his eyes' to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious to view."
Id.
9 Adcor Indus., Inc. v. Bevcorp, LLC, 411 F. Supp. 2d 778, 786 (N.D. Ohio 2005) ("Once a plaintiff
learns facts causing the statute of limitations to begin running with respect to one trade secret claim, it
begins to run on all trade secret claims as well.").
1oo
See id. at 786-87 (concluding the plaintiff had sufficient reason to suspect defendants
misappropriated their trade secrets). The plaintiffs merely chose to forgo an investigation to confirm their
suspicions. Id.
101 See id. at 785-86.
102 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2005). "MPS did
not forfeit its right to a jury trial by taking any steps that would have required it, historically, to file its case
in equity." Id. Rather, "MPS lacked evidence of damages and granted 02 Micro's motion for summary
adjudication on that issue." Id.
103 See, e.g., Sanirab Corp. v. Sunroc Corp., No. OOC 02 191 SCD, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 350 (Del.
Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2002) ("A claim for conversion does not apply when the Trade Secrets Chapter of the
Delaware code can be invoked."). See also Intera Co. v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 92 6324, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4388 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 1994) (holding Tennessee does not recognize a conversion claim for trade
secrets).
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some are able to subsist in situations where there is information that is not considered a
trade secret, but rather some other property that was converted. 10 4 One should keep in mind
that there are four elements to a conversion cause of action. 10 5 The fourth element requires a
demand for possession.1 0 6 A party must actually make that demand for absolute and
unqualified possession.' 0 ' In CaterpillarInc. v. Sturman Industries, Inc., the plaintiff was
litigating a conversion claim.108 The defendant had satisfied the first three elements, but
there was no evidence they had ever made the formal demand for possession. 10 9 The lack of
demand resulted in the conversion claim being thrown out. 110

D. Combination Analysis
An attorney must always perform the "combination analysis" in a trade secrets case.111
This means that, while each individual element of the alleged trade secret may not itself be a
trade secret, it is possible to argue that the combination creates an economic value not
generally known in the trade. 112 The case Catalyst & Chemical Services, Inc. v. Global
Broung Support states that a combination qualifies as a trade secret only where there is
11 3
added value to the combination over the value of the individual elements.

CONCLUSION

The protection of trade secrets provides a business with a competitive advantage over
competitors who are not privy to the proprietary information comprising the trade secrets.
As opposed to other forms of intellectual property protection that are created by
governmental action, such as patent and trademark protection, trade secrets are created
114
when individuals or corporations declare that the subject matter being claimed is a secret.
With companies increasingly attempting to protect information by designating it as a trade
secret, an increase in trade secret-related litigation has emerged, leading to recent trends
arising from such litigation. While the law of trade secrets is far from universal, these recent

101 See Virtual Cloud Servs. v. CH2M Hill, Inc., No. 02 CV 01004, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537, **7-8
(D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2006).
105 See generally Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 844 (1st Dist. 1998) (stating in Illinois, a
conversion cause of action requires: "(1) a right in the property; (2) the right to immediate, absolute, and
unconditional possession of the property; (3) defendant's unauthorized and wrongful assumption of control,
dominion, or ownership over the property; and (4) a demand for possession").
1o Id.
107 Hoch v. Young, 63 N.C. App. 480, 483 (Ct. App. 1983). "Where there has been no wrongful taking or
disposal of the goods, and the defendant has merely come rightfully into possession and then refused to
surrender them, demand and refusal are necessary to the existence of the tort. Id. "When demand is made,
and absolute, unqualified refusal to surrender, which puts the plaintiff to the necessity of force or a lawsuit to
recover his own property, is of course a conversion." Id.
108 Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc., No. 99-CV-1201, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30411, *2 (C.D. Ill.
Nov. 22, 2005).
109 Id. The defendants moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law on the conversion claim based on the
plaintiffs failure to prove the making of a demand for the possession of the patents. Id.
110 Id. at *9 (C[N]oreasonable jury could find that Caterpillar has established a demand for possession
of these patents[, therefore the] Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law must be granted.").
' Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2001).
112 Catalyst & Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Global Broung Support, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.C. 2004) ("[A] trade
secret can exist in a combination of characteristics . . . and 'even if all of the information [about those
characteristics] is publicly available, a unique combination of that information, which adds value to the
information... may qualify as a trade secret."').
113 Id.
114 See 3 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.02 (2006).
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developments continue to remove the uncertainties concerning the parameters of trade
secrets protection.

71

